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THE ROLE OF COMPULSION IN ISLAMIC
CONVERSION: JIHAD, DHIMMA AND RIDDA
Donna E. Arzt*
INTRODUCTION
The Qur'anic pronouncement, "there is no compulsion in religion"
(Sura 2, verse 256), is as succinct a statement as any of the principle of
freedom of religion. This freedom has been said to encompass not only the
freedom to hold theistic beliefs as well as the freedom to hold non-theistic
beliefs, but also the freedom to change one's religion or belief or to refuse
to change one's religion or belief, all without coercion or discrimination.' In
other words, an assertion of non-compulsion is put to the test when con-
fronted by instances of conversion to and from the religion in question.
Yet how truly free is religious freedom as delineated by Islam?
Consider the cry of jihad, popularly (mis)translated as "holy war against
non-Muslims," or the fatwa (decree) of death for "apostates" such as
Salman Rushdie of England or Taslima Nasrin (known as "the female
Salman Rushdie") of Bangladesh. These are words that evoke among non-
Muslims the images of ancient desert battles led by sword-yielding horse-
men or, in contemporary form, suicide bombers on commercial aircraft, an-
thrax-tipped missiles, or assassins' bullets targeted at authors and their
publishers and translators. 2 Clearly, in none of these cases, is the target of
* Bond, Schoeneck & King Distinguished Professor of Law and Director, Center
for Global Law and Practice, Syracuse University College of Law. This paper was
principally prepared for the Working Group on Legal Cultures of Islamic Societies
and Human Rights, Project on Universality and Particularity of Human Rights, In-
stitute for Interdisciplinary Research ("FEST"), Heidelberg, Germany, prior to Sep-
tember 11, 2001.
1 See Oldrich Andrysek, Non-believers: A New Aspect of Religious Intolerance?
2 CONSCIENCE AND LIBERTY 15, 22 (1990), (citing Report of the Special Rap-
porteur on Intolerance and Discrimination in Matters of Religion or Belief of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., Capital Provisional
Agenda Item 24, Committee on Human Rights, at 60, 113, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1990/46 (1990)).
2 During the decade since the Ayatollah Khomeini issued his fatwa of death
against Salman Rushdie, one of the novelist's translators has been killed and an-
other seriously wounded, while other Muslim authors have been murdered in
Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. See FOR RUSHDIE: ESSAYS BY ARAB AND MUS-
LIM WRrERS IN DEFENSE OF FREE SPEECH (Anouar Abdallah ed., 1993). See also
Eric Weiner, Bangladesh Writer Draws Death Threat, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONI-
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the decree or attack seen as free to choose whether to accept or reject its
initiator's entreaties.
Since September 11, 2001, dozens if not hundreds of commentators
in the U.S. media have pondered whether the perpetrators of the World
Trade Center and Pentagon attacks were motivated by pure theological ha-
tred against the secular Western infidel or other, more geopolitical factors'
The term jihad, in particular, has been invoked repeatedly, whether in direct
reference to Osama bin Laden's 1998 pronouncement on behalf of the
World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders,4 or to'
question whether violence against non-combatant civilians is ever sanc-
tioned by Islam.5 What, however, if most of the popular media commentary
is based on misunderstandings - or worse, ignorance manipulated by mili-
tant propagandists - about Islam's basic principles and obligations in re-
gard to the treatment of non-Muslims and former Muslims?
The only way to be certain is to look to the theological and histori-
cal underpinnings of the religion (as well as literature that is not subjec-
TOR, April 1, 1994, at 8 (discussing Nasrin). Nasrin, who remains a Muslim, has
been accused of blasphemy, not apostasy.
I A small sampling includes John F.Burns, America Inspires Both Longing and
Loathing in Arab World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A4; Hillel Fradkin, Why
Do They Hate Us? The Muslim World Has Fallen Behind, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE,
December 1, 2001, at 26; Sohail Hashmi, The Terrorists' Zealotry is Political Not
Religious, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 30, 2001; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the
Name of God, CURRENT HISTORY, November 2001; Salman Rushdie, Yes, This is
About Islam, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 2, 2001; Stephen W. Bosworth et al., Why Do They
Hate Us?, BOSTON GLOBE, September 16, 2001, at Dl, D2. A Lexis-Nexis search
conducted in the NewsGroup file for the dates 9/11/01 to 1/18/02 produced 98
items containing the phrase "Why do they hate us?" (A handful of these concerned
sports rather than the terrorist attacks.)
4 The declaration stated: "To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and mili-
tary, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country, where this
is possible, until the Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Haram Mosque [in
Mecca] are freed from their grip and until their armies, shattered and broken-
winged, depart from all the lands of Islam." Hendrik Hertzberg & David Remnick,
The Trap, NEW YORKER, Oct. 1, 2001, at 37.
5 See, e.g. Roy Mottahedeh, Islam and the Opposition to Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2001; Jeffrey L. Sheler, Alive in the Presence of Their Lord, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Oct. 1, 2001, at 38. To gauge the Western media's fixation with
the term jihad, consider that for the four month period between 5/10/01 and 9/10/
01, the Lexis-Nexis NewsGroup file contains 277 items with "jihad" in the head-
line, whereas for the four month period between 9/11/01 and 1/11/01, the same file
contains over 1000 such headlines, too many for the search to be completed.
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tively influenced by traumatic recent events). It is therefore one purpose of
this article to explore the classical origins of the concepts of jihad and apos-
tasy in Islam, along with the related concept of dhimma, which deals with
the relationship between the Muslim community and certain minority relig-
ious communities. A second purpose is to examine whether modem Muslim
spokespersons and fatwa-issuers are speaking in terms consistent with the
classical traditions of Islam when they invoke these classical doctrines and
apply them in certain contemporary contexts involving non-Muslims, for-
mer Muslims and heterodox Muslims. 6 Due to limitations of source material
and space, this article focuses on the fundamental tenets of Islam as a
whole, not on the nuances and variations of particular schools of theology
or sects, such as the Saudi-based Wahhabi movement to which Osama bin
Laden and his al-Qaeda followers adhere.7
Because of the controversial nature of jihad, the Islamic prohibition
on apostasy, and other aspects of conversion to and from Islam, full disclo-
sure of an author's own viewpoint on these issues is appropriate. As a spe-
cialist in contemporary international human rights, and an American law
school-trained, non-Muslim, non-Arabic speaking, Jewish non-cleric at that,
I am inherently suspicious of actions which involve coercion or other inter-
ference with individual freedom of belief. (Moreover, I have spent the last
30 months closely following the trial of two Libyans for the bombing of
Pan Am 103 from the perspective of the survivor families.8 ) My own per-
spective is reflected in the U.N. Human Rights Committee's 1993 General
Comment on Freedom of Religion or Belief (interpreting Article 18 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights):
[F]reedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief neces-
sarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, in-
cluding, inter alia, the right to replace one's current
religion or belief. [International law] bars coercion that
would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief,
including the use or threat of physical force or penal sanc-
6 For purposes of this paper, the term "classical" in the context of Islam refers to
the period from 622 C.E., when the Prophet Muhammed and his followers left
Mecca to establish the first Islamic community in Medina, until the middle of the
10th century, with the "closing of the door of ijtihad," the post-Qur'anic reasoning
and creative interpretation of Islamic law which epitomized Muslim thought after
the death of Muhammed in 632 C.E. through the religion's first three centuries.
7 See Neil MacFarquar, Bin Laden Adheres to Austere Form of Islam, N.Y.
Tnvms, October 7, 2001, 1B at 7.
8 See Donna E. Arzt, The Lockerbie Trial - Families Project Web-site: Victim
Assistance Goes Online, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 121 (2001).
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tions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their
religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion
or belief or to convert.9
While such a point of view may, on first impression, appear hostile to Islam
as it is popularly perceived in the West, closer examination will reveal that
jihad as a militaristic method of proselytizing is but one version, for there
are multiple interpretations10 of the Qur'an's injunctions to struggle in
God's cause. Similarly, the nature of the classical Islamic punishment for
apostasy is open to interpretation. As seen below, a multiplicity of view-
points applies both to the case of conversion to Islam and conversion from
Islam.
The body of this article is divided into four main parts: Part I de-
scribes the "vocabulary of jihad' during the first few centuries after
Muhammed. Part II looks at the rights of non-Muslim monotheists (dhim-
mis) during this same time frame, while Part III discusses the classical pro-
hibition on apostasy (ridda). Part IV, which is subdivided into sections on
jihad, dhimma and ridda, describes some contemporary cases which indi-
vidually and collectively serve to test whether the treatment of non-Mus-
lims, apostates and heterodox Muslim sects is consistent with the
understanding of these concepts within classical Shariah law. Part IV is
preceded by a short coda which attempts to summarize the previous three
parts and bridges the article's theme of coercion versus choice.
I. THE VOCABULARY OF JIHAD
Universality is a predominant theme within both Sunni and Shi'ite
Islam, given their fundamental teaching that Islam is the primordial faith
that began with Adam and Eve, the first humans, developed through Abra-
ham and his son Ishmael, modified by Jesus and finally came to revealed
fruition with Muhammed. 1 Thus, anyone, of any race, can become Muslim,
9 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment on Article 18, ICCPR, 5,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/CPR.2/Rev.1 (1993). See also BAHIYYIH TAHZIB, FREEDOM
OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: ENSURING EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION
325-327 (1996).
10 See Donna E. Arzt, The Treatment of Religious Dissidents Under Classical and
Contemporary Islamic Law, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGI-rrs IN GLOBAL PERSPEC-
TiVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 408-410 (John Witte, Jr. and Johan D. van der
Vyver eds, 1996) on the variety of streams of thought within Islam.
11 "He hath ordained for you that religion which He commended until Noah, and
that which We inspire thee (Muhammed), and that which We commended unto
Abraham and Moses and Jesus, saying: 'Establish the religion, and be not divided
therein.'" (Qur'an 42:13). See also T.W. ARNOLD, THE PREACHING OF ISLAM 30-
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simply by consciously submitting to God by reciting the Shahadah, the pro-
fession of faith, which is the first of five "pillars" of Islam which every
Muslim, regardless of location or school of jurisprudence, shares: "There is
no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his Prophet (or Messenger)."'1 2 Con-
version requires no other initiation ritual such as a baptism. "Assent to these
two simple doctrines is all that is demanded of the con-
vert .... Unencumbered with theological subtleties, it may be expounded by
any, even the most unversed in theological expression."' 13
Shari'ah is the "Whole Duty of Mankind," not merely of the Mus-
lims. "But it is nothing less than a Message to all the world." (Qur'an
68:52)14 "We have sent thee not, except to mankind entire, good tidings to
bear, and warning." (34:27) Its ethical, moral and spiritual norms are in-
tended for all; concomitantly, Islam is a world-wide religious, cultural and
spiritual community that disregards race, nationalism and territory. 15 Many
passages of the Qur'an are accordingly addressed to "humankind" and the
"Children of Adam," or refer to Muhammed' s message to "all creatures" or
31 (1914). During the second century after Muhammed's death, a variety of
schools of jurisprudence developed which began to diverge in their interpretations
of Qur'an and Sunna. But these divisions are not of major significance regarding
the question of proselytizing. Even between orthodox Sunni and heretical Shi'ite
jurists, interpretations over the obligation of jihad primarily differed only over
whether or not the head of the Muslim community, who would lead the jihad, must
be a divinely appointed Imam. The obligation to undertake the struggle was held in
common. See also Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, The Development of Jihad in Islamic
Revelation and History, in CROSS, CRESCENT AND SWORD: THE JUSTIFICATION AND
LIMITATION OF WAR IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITION 40-41 (James Turner
Johnson and John Kelsay eds., 1990).
12 The other four pillars are 1) daily prayer at dawn, noon, mid-afternoon, evening
and night; 2) fasting during the month of Ramadan; 3) alms-giving (zakat); and 4)
the pilgrimage to Mecca (Haj) for all who are capable. GEDDES MACGREGOR, Dic-
TIONARY OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 251-252 (1989).
13 Arnold, supra note 11, at 418. See generally RICHARD C. B ULLIET, CONVER-
SION TO ISLAM IN THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD: AN ESSAY IN QUANTITATIVE HISTORY
(1979).
14 This is the Yusufali translation, with which Shakir ("it is nothing but a reminder
to the nations") closely concurs. By contrast, in the Pickthall translation ("it is
naught but a Reminder to (His) creatures"), the universality is lost, at http://
www.usc.edu/deptlMSA/quran/. Unless otherwise noted, this article uses the
Pickthall translation of the Qur'an. See MARMADUKE PICKTHALL, THE GLORIOUS
KORAN: A BI-LINGUAL EDITION WITH ENGLISH (1976).
15 See MAHMOOD AHMAD GHAZI, THE HIJRAH: ITS PHILOSOPHY AND MESSAGE
FOR THE MODERN MAN 51-59 (1981).
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"the peoples. 1 6 Muslims therefore have a duty to propagate the Qur'an's
message to the rest of humanity, in order to establish a universal
civilization.
Although Islam accepts both the Jewish and Christian Testaments
as books of revelation, albeit inferior to the Qur'an, it does not adopt their
use of the term "proselyte" as either "a resident alien in the land" or one
who has left her religious community and converted to another religion.1 7
The more positively connoted term "evangelical" is, similarly, of Christian
origin, while "missionary" is associated by Muslims with Western colonial-
ism and "Orientalist" thinking. "Conversion," too, evokes images of the
Crusades. 18
The Arabic word tabligh roughly translates as "proselytization,"
while al-Da'wah is "the Call to Preaching." But these are used much less
often than jihad, which itself is frequently misunderstood by non-Muslims
when translated as "Holy War." According to contemporary scholar Abdul-
aziz Sachedina, this misconception is due in part to the writings of individ-
ual 8th to 10th century Islamic scholars who sought to provide a "religious
legitimation for the territorial expansion of the Muslim rulers," overlooking
the Qur'an's uses of an entirely different term, qital, for military action, and
harb for military war.19
Jihad is perhaps best translated as the duty to "struggle" or "sacri-
fice" in the path of God, based on the Qur'anic use of the term as a means
to "make Allah's cause succeed. '20 The struggle can be personal and inter-
nal, as against cravings and temptations that prevent one from behaving
virtuously, or it can be communal and external, which requires combating
evil, establishing a just political order, and spreading the cause of Allah
among the unbelievers. "Ye should believe in Allah and His messenger, and
should strive for the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives."
(Qur'an 61:11) In this verse, the word jihad takes the place of "strive for
the cause of Allah" in the original Arabic. But in other passages, the Mus-
lims are directly authorized to fight - in defense against those who aggress
16 See e.g., Qur'anic verses 13:38, 21:107, 31:33, and 68:52.
17 Eugene P. Heideman, Proselytism, Mission and the Bible, 20 INTERNATIONAL
BULLETIN OF MISSIONARY RESEARCH 10, 12 (January 1996).
18 Betty Beard, Antioch Conversion Tactics Rile Muslims, ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
August 19, 1995. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORiENTALISM (1979); EDWARD
W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1983); EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING ISLAM:
How THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS DETERMINE How WE SEE THE REST OF THE
WORLD (1981).
19 Sachedina, supra note 11, at 36-38.
20 Id. at 36.
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against them, or who breach an armistice. "Fight in the way of Allah against
those who fight against you, but begin not hostilities. Lo! Allah loveth not
aggression." (2:190) "Sanction is given unto those who fight because they
have been wronged." (22:39) It is unclear in these passages whether being
"wronged" and "aggressed against" are generic provocations or refer specif-
ically to being attacked militarily; other verses indicate that provocations
include, for instance, "persecution. 21
Even in the most militant versions of jihad, unbelievers were not to
be attacked outright without first receiving a summons (da'wah) either to
convert or to submit to the jizya tax22 that Shari'ah imposed on non-Mus-
lims. Two passages in the Qur'an support this doctrine:
Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhor-
tation, and reason with them in the better way. Lo! thy Lord
is best aware of him who strayeth from His way, and He is
best aware of those who go aright. (16:125) We never pun-
ish until we have sent a messenger. (17:15)23
These are further supported by a hadith, "the invitation to Islam is essential
before declaring war."2 4 According to modem Islam scholar Rudolph Pe-
ters, "the function of the summons is to inform the enemy that the Moslems
do not fight them for worldly reasons, like subjecting them and taking their
property, but that their motive is a religious one, the strengthening of
Islam. "25
Like any great book, the Qur'an's 114 Suras contain verses that
support a variety of, even contradictory, perspectives, more militant ver-
sions of jihad as well as more passive and defensive ones. Contrast harsh
21 "Tell those who disbelieve that if they cease (from persecution of believers)
that which is past will be forgiven them; but if they return (thereto) then the exam-
ple of the men of old hath already gone (before them for a warning). And fight
them until persecution is no more, and religion is all for Allah. But if they cease,
then lo! Allah is Seer of what they do." (8:38-39).
22 See Part II of this paper concerning the taxes imposed on non-Muslims. See
also ALBERT HouRANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 35 (1991); DANIEL C.
DENNETr, CONVERSION AND THE POLL TAX IN EARLY ISLAM (1950).
23 Pickthall. Yusufali translates this as "nor would We visit with Our Wrath until
We had sent a messenger (to give warning)," at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/
quran. See also 22:67 which instructs to "summon thou unto thy Lord."
24 LARRY POSTON, ISLAMIC DA'WAH IN THE WEST 14 (1992) (citing a hadith re-
corded by Bukhri).
25 RUDOLPH PETERS, ISLAM AND COLONIALISM: THE DOCTRINE OF JIHAD IN MOD-
ERN HISTORY 18 (1979), cited in POSTON, supra note 24.
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passages such as, "But those who did wrong changed the word which had
been told them for another saying, and We sent down upon the evil-doers
wrath from heaven for their evil-doing," (2:59) with one that recommends
tolerance: "If ye punish, then punish with the like of that wherewith ye were
afflicted. But if ye endure patiently, verily it is better for the patient. Endure
thou patiently (0 Muhammad)." (16:126-127)26 Other passages indicate
that it is Allah, not the Muslim armies, who are to inflict punishment:
"Whoso disbelieveth the revelations of Allah (will find that) lo! Allah is
swift at reckoning." (3:19) "The duty of the messenger is only to convey
(the message). Allah knoweth what ye proclaim and what ye hide." (5:99)
Even the most harsh verse above, from Sura 2, indicates that wrath comes
later, from heaven, not from Muslims in the here-and-now. "And whoso
seeketh as religion other than the Surrender (to Allah) it will not be ac-
cepted from him, and he will be a loser in the Hereafter." (3:85).
Yet classical Islam saw the world as a battleground where Muslim
believers and unbelieving infidels waged war. The jurists accordingly di-
vided it into two parts: the territory under Islamic rule, called dar al-Islam,
and the rest of the world ruled by non-Muslim powers, called dar al-Harb,
the territory of war, or dar al-Kufr, the sphere of unbelief. There was no
such state as that of neutrality. A harbi, or member of the dar al-Harb, was
an unsubjugated unbeliever and by definition, an enemy of Islam. Accord-
ing to 20th century scholar Majid Khadduri: "The territory of war was the
object, not the subject, of Islam, and it was the duty of the Imam [or
Khalifah], head of the Islamic state, to extend the validity of its Law and
Justice to the unbelievers at the earliest possible moment. '27
But only overtly hostile infidels had to be vanquished; thus, jihad,
according to some schools of jurisprudence, was only to be invoked defen-
sively. Early scholars such as Abu Hanifa and Shaybani, who stressed tol-
erance toward non-believers, "made no explicit declarations that the jihad
was a war to be waged against non-Muslims solely on the grounds of disbe-
lief." However, another early scholar, Shafi'i, formulated the doctrine that
jihad was to be waged on unbelievers for reason of their disbelief, not only
26 This call for patience is reinforced by proximity. It appears immediately after
the passage quoted earlier that requires a summons to the unbelievers and reasoning
with them.
27 MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 163, 164 (1984).
Imam is the term used by Shi'ites, Khalifah (caliph) by Sunnis, to refer to the com-
munity's leader. The Shi'ites require their Imam to be a descendent of Ali, Muham-
med's son-in-law.
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when they openly fought Muslims. 2 Sa'id Hawa, a member of the modem
Muslim Brotherhood movement in Syria, has derived five varieties of jihad
from the Qur'an and hadith: jihad through language; jihad through learn-
ing; jihad through body and mind; political jihad; and financial jihad.29
These varying interpretations are further complicated by the linguistic con-
fusion between the words "surrender" and "convert," as the Arabic for "sur-
render" or "submit," aslamu, is related to the word Muslim ("one who
submits").30 Clearly, some of the people who "submitted," the dhimmi
"People of the Book" (discussed more thoroughly in the next section of this
paper), did not also convert.
Intended to protect the welfare of the Muslim community against
enemies, jihad might be analogized to the modem concept of "national se-
curity" as a justification for state action and all it entails.31 Like "national
security," which realistically may be needed to protect the state, or in Ger-
man constitutional jurisprudence, the similar need for "defense of democ-
racy," the concept of "strengthening Islam" could also be abused in the
form of imperialism abroad and human rights violations at home, particu-
larly given that dying in battle has always been considered the highest form
of witness to Allah, for which one will attain paradise in the hereafter.32
28 See id. at 165-166. After the classical period, when Islamic power began to
decline, some scholars construed jihad as only a defensive duty, dormant until ac-
tual danger loomed. Id. at 168-170.
29 See Ibrahim Malik, Jihad - Its Development and Relevance, 2 PALESTINE-
ISRAEL JOURNAL 32, 33 (Spring 1994).
30 BULLIET, supra note 13, at 124. Bulliet quotes a hadith about Muhammed's
stipulation that a group of people should surrender/convert (aslamu): "He sent them
his emissaries and governors to familiarize them with the laws of Islam and his
practices and to collect their alms and the poll tax on those of them who remained
Christians, Jews or Zoroastians." Bulliet then comments: "But the language does
not allow the reader to disentangle the meanings 'surrender' and 'convert.' This
raises the question as to whether these meanings were actually raised in the minds
of the actors. After all, the notion of religious conversion as a moral or spiritual act
that could be taken independently of other political or social action may not have
been widespread in seventh-century Arabia." Id.
31 Joan Fitzpatrick, Protection Against Abuse of the Concept of 'Emergency,' in
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 203-228 (Louis Henkin and
John L. Hargrove eds. 1994).
32 JOHN ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT: MYTH OR REALITY 33 (1992); see Ab-
dulaziz A. Sachedina, Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Qur'an, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES: WESTERN AND ISLAMIC PER-
SPECTIVES ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 84 (David Little, et al. eds., 1988); Khadduri,
supra note 27, at 164-170 (1984). Note that all three translators, Pickthall, Yusufali
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Once force is justified in the name of a greater good, it is a short step to
using force arbitrarily and disproportionately. Moreover, it is easy to boot-
strap a legitimate justification, used in an appropriate context, into another
altogether illegitimate setting.
Jihad, along with its corrolary, hijirat, meaning migration, 33 has
historically served as a rallying cry for territorial expansion of Islamic rule.
"[M]igration has been a persistent and recurring feature in the Islamic faith,
and its successful evolution and propagation. Migration was intended to
protect the faithful from further persecution, weaken the society of 'non-
believers,' and enable them to take part in the creation of a new Islamic
community.' '34 Some Islamic jurists have argued that the only legitimate
reason for Muslims to remain outside the dar al-Islam (sphere of believers),
that is, outside their own states, is da'wa, proselytization. 35 Indeed, the first
hirja was that of Muhammed and his followers who left Mecca for Medina
in 622 C.E. It was then that Muhammed engaged in armed battles with the
Quraysh tribe, thereby launching the expansion of his power, territory and
claim to a universal message, directed not only to the Arabian peninsula but
to the whole world.3 6
The twentieth century scholar H.A.R. Gibb believed that the earliest
conversions within Arabia occurred on three different levels: i) a small
group of total converts, who inwardly accepted Islam's laws and principles;
ii) a group of formal adherents, mainly merchants, who accepted Islam's
easy outward prescriptions and duties because of the economic advantage
of conversion, but who did not assimilate the new faith on a spiritual level;
and iii) the pagan tribes whose adherence was enforced by threat of military
and Shakir, use the word "fight" in the verse beginning "Fight those who do not
believe in Allah..." (9:29), available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran.
33 Most verses of the Qur'an which employ the derivative form of hijra, hajaru
("they migrated"), are paired with jahadu ("they waged war"), thus implying a
close relationship between hijra and jihad. See Muhammad Khalid Masud, The
Obligation to Migrate: The Doctrine of Hijra in Islamic Law, in MUSLIM TRAv-
ELERS: PILGRIMAGE, MIGRATION AND RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION 32 (Dale F. Eick-
elman and James Piscatori eds., 1990).
34 See Human Rights, Migration and Asylum: The "Three Traditions" in Middle
Eastern-Islamic Civilizations 4 (paper prepared by a group of unnamed Islamic
scholars for the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees) [hereinafter
Human Rights, Migration and Asylum]. See also Sami A. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, The
Islamic Conception of Migration, 30 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 37 (1996).
35 See Eickelman and Piscatori, supra note 33, at 37, 259, citing ISMAIL R.
FARUQI, THE HURAH: THE NECESSITY OF ITS IQAMAT OR VERGEGENW' ARTIGUNG
(1985).
36 See HOURANI, supra note 22, at 18, 22.
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sanctions. 37 By contrast, outside of Arabia, non-Arab polytheists converted
to Islam with such alacrity that they far out-numbered the ruling Arab class
and often caused fiscal crises by becoming exempt from the poll taxes.38
Nevertheless, despite Muhammed's proclamation that "all Muslims
are brothers," non-Arab converts were not always received wholeheartedly.
Although often well educated, they were rarely accepted socially and had to
attach themselves to an Arab family or tribe as clients (mawali). In Spain,
the mawali eventually became Arabicized, causing the term mawali itself to
disappear by the 8th century. But in the eastern part of the empire, the
Arabs were ultimately absorbed by their subjects, and while Islam remained
the dominant religion, Iranian, Turkish, Berber and Indian culture
prevailed.39
II. THE RIGHTS OF NON-MUSLIMS
While Muslims have a duty to propagate Islam among non-Muslim
infidels, Shari'ah prohibits non-Muslims living under Muslim rule from
propagating their faith among Muslims and from preventing one of their
own from converting to Islam.40 However, "recognition of the right of non-
Muslims to live according to their convictions and at the same time in
peaceful harmony and close cooperation with Muslims was one of the
Prophet's prominent achievements," according to a contemporary
commentator.
4 1
Non-Muslims in the dar al-Islam were treated differently depend-
ing on whether or not they were "People of the Book," those whose faith
was based, like that of Muslims, on revealed scripture (ahl al-kitab). Is-
lamic law granted the protected status of dhimma (contract or guarantee) to
communities of the other scriptural monotheisms, Christianity, Judaism and
Zoroastrianism. Freedom to practice their religion, including freedom from
pressure to convert, was one of the traditional privileges of dhimmis (also
37 H.A.R. GiBB, STUDIES ON THE CIVILIZATION OF ISLAM 5 (1969).
38 See BULLIET, supra note 13, at 132.
39 See Maan Z. Madina, The Disruption and Decline of the Arab Empire, in THE
COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 271, 267-279 (John A. Garraty & Peter Gay,
eds., 1972); see also HouRANI, supra note 22, at 30.
40 Conversely, for Muslims, submission to foreign domination is a religious
crime; actual conversion to another religion was traditionally a capital offense. See
ABDULLAHI A. AN-NA'IM, TOwARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-91, 144-149 (1990). See also Abdul-
lahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Civil Rights in the Islamic Constitutional Tradition: Shared
Ideals and Divergent Regimes, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 267, 289 (1992).
41 Human Rights, Migration and Asylum, supra note 34, at 5.
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known as kitabis).42 This freedom also included protection from desecration
of their holy sites and autonomy in appointment of religious leaders, as well
as juridical autonomy in civil matters and equality with Muslims of punish-
ment and restitution in criminal matters.43 Muhammed had decreed that the
People of the Book be treated with tolerance. "Lo! those who believe, and
those who are Jews, and Sabaeans, and Christians - whosoever believeth
in [God]44 and the Last Day and doeth right - there shall be no fear come
upon them, neither shall they grieve." (Qur'an 5:69) The justification was
that monotheistic, revelatory religions which originated before Islam were
embryonic, incomplete and flawed if not distorted versions of Islam itself,
but deserving of at least a limited tolerance.
The Sunna reports the Prophet as stating: "Whoever wrongs a
[dhimmi] or lays on him a burden beyond his strength, I shall be his accuser
on the Day of Judgment. '45 Muhammed guaranteed to the Christians of
Najran and the neighboring territories that:
[T]he security of God and the pledge of his Prophet are
extended for their lives, their religion and their property -
to the present as well as the absent and others besides; there
shall be no interference with [the practice of] their faith or
their observances; nor any change in their rights or privi-
leges; no bishop shall be removed from his bishopric; nor
any monk from his monastery; nor any priest from his
priesthood, and they shall continue to enjoy everything
42 See Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic
Law, 14 Wis. INrr'L L. J. 349, 381-383 (1996); see also BERNARD LEWIS, THE JEWS
OF ISLAM (1984).
43 See C.G. WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 90-91 (1988). See also
RAPHAEL PATAI, THE SEED OF ABRAHAM: JEWS AND ARABS IN CONTACT AND CON-
FLIcT 45-46 (1986), 45-46; BAT YE'OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS
UNDER ISLAM 57-67 (1985). However, scholars disagree as to whether dhimmis
were free to engage in practices which conflicted outright with Islam, such as the
consumption, sale and production of alcohol. See Arzt, supra note 42, at 382 n. 134.
44 Pickthall translates "God" in this verse as "Allah," as do Yusufali and Shakir, at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran. But the sense of the verse is that the People
of the Book worship God, the same God as the Muslims, albeit of a different name,
at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/103.qmt.html. The third Khalifah, Umar,
added the Zoroastrians of Persia to the "People of the Book" classification;
Mandaeans and others were added later.
45 WEERAMANTRY, supra note 43, at 86. Another hadith reports that Muhammed
lodged several members of the tribe of Thaqif, who were non-scriptural "unbeliev-
ers," in his own mosque. Id.
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great and small as heretofore; no image or cross shall be
destroyed; they shall not oppress or be oppressed; they
shall not practice the rights of blood vengeance as in the
Days of Ignorance; no tithes shall be levied from them nor
shall they be required to furnish provisions for the troops.46
Nevertheless, dhimmis were conquered peoples who had agreed to
submit to Muslim rule. The benefits of the dhimma contract carried con-
comitant burdens, the badges of dhimmis' second-class status. Dhimmis
could not hold political or judicial office outside their local community
structure and could not testify in litigation involving Muslims. They could
not marry Muslim women and were forbidden to carry arms, to ride horses
or mules, to walk in the middle of the street, to sell their books or religious
articles in marketplaces, to raise their voices during worship, or to build
churches or synagogues, tombs or houses higher than those of Muslims.
Dhimmis were also required to wear distinctive clothing and hair styles,
which set them apart from Muslims, and to stand in the presence of Mus-
lims. 47 As already noted, they were not to convert Muslims to their religion
nor prevent one of their own from converting to Islam. Moreover, if the
People of the Book refused the dhimma compact, they had only the choice
of death or conversion to Islam - either before or after their defeat in war.
The other class of non-Muslims who were not dhimmis were slaves,
the fate of polytheists and idolators who had been captured as prisoners of
war rather than slain in or after battle. They had the choice only of slavery,
conversion to Islam, or death; no special communal contract allowed them
to quietly or even humbly practice their religion. "Then, when the sacred
months have passed [when a treaty with idolators has expired], slay the
idolators wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and beseige them,
and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worship
and pay the poor-due [i.e. convert], then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is
Forgiving, Merciful." (Qur'an 9:5).
46 Id. at 85-86, (citing to SAYED AMEER AL, THE SPIRrr OF ISLAM 273 (1981)).
47 Non-indigent, able-bodied dhimmi males paid the jizya poll tax in exchange for
avoiding military conscription, in addition to property taxes (kharaj). See LAW IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 363-364 (Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny eds, 1955).
See also PATAI, supra note 43, at 45-46; AN-NA'M, supra note 40, at 88-91, 144-
149. Hence, modem scholars such as An-Na'im consider the dhimma contract to
constitute coerced submission rather than a charter of rights. Dhimmis were treated
in a discriminatory manner, which sometimes rose to the level of outright persecu-
tion, such as when they were massacred or subjected to forced conversions. See
YE'OR, supra note 43, at 60-61 (citing examples in Armenia in the years 704-705
and 852-855, and numerous similar examples after the classical era).
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The Islamic toleration of slavery offered various advantages - to
Muslims: "economically, through the profitable slave trade, socially
through the institution of concubinage and the harem, and politically as in-
dividual slaves gained power as favorites, bodyguards, and rulers. '48 But
like the dhimma compact that established a de jure segregation of Muslims
and non-Muslims, with clearly inferior status for the latter, it could also be
justified on theological grounds:
Since the Islamic state is basically an ideological state, only
those persons are to be primarily entrusted with its adminis-
tration who believe in its ideology, are conversant with its
spirit, and have dedicated themselves to the promotion of
the objectives of the state .... This does not mean that the
Islamic state taboos the utilization of non-Muslims in the
service of the state. This only means that while availing of
the services of non-Muslims, due care should be taken that
the Islamic character of the state is not compromised and
the ideological demands are not sacrificed on the altar of so
called "tolerance". 49
A further explanation for slavery, which also accounts for the sec-
ond-class status accorded dhimma religions, may expose Islam's defensive
attitude about its own potential apostates, a subject to be explored below.
The Qur'an warns: "Oh ye who believe! If ye obey a party of those who
have received the Scripture, they will make you disbelievers after your be-
lief." (3:100) "0 Ye who believe! Choose not for guardians such of those
who received the Scripture before you, and of the disbelievers, as make a
jest and sport of your religion. But keep your duty to Allah if ye are true
believers." (5:57) These passages may reflect a concern that "the Bedouin
[Arab tribes who staffed the Muslim foreign legions], many of whom had
recently converted from paganism to Islam, could have been attracted by
the civilizations of the conquered peoples among whom they were a minor-
ity," particularly given that the indigenous religions were more established.
"Thus the abasement of the other religions, no less than the privileges of the
conquerors, served to reinforce the Muslim Arabs' feelings of superior-
48 Madina, supra note 39, at 271.
49 AMIR HASAN SIDDIQI, NON-MUSLIMS UNDER MUSLIM RULE AND MUSLIMS
UNDER NoN-MUSLIM RULE 2 (1969). The author also notes that non-Muslims "got
more than their due share in government service. In such lucrative occupations as
banking, large commercial ventures, linen trade, land ownership, medical profes-
sion etc., the Christians and Jews were well represented and firmly established."
Id. at 8-9.
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ity." 50 Or perhaps, their feelings of insecurity in relation to older
monotheisms?
III. THE PROHIBITION ON APOSTASY
Because orthodox Muslims consider Islamic law to constitute, com-
prehensively, the Whole Duty of Mankind, and to be divine, eternal, correct
and immutable, any allegation that all or any aspect of it is less than ideal
would inevitably be seen not only as an affront, but as a disloyal act of
treason against Allah and against the unity and eternal values of the believ-
ing community. Such allegations must, therefore, be resisted and punished,
in order to protect believers not only from injury but also from the possibil-
ity of change, which challenges to immutability represent.
Accordingly, in classical Islam, those Muslims who renounced their
belief in Islam - who "disbeliev[ed] after having believed"5' - were con-
sidered apostates. On the basis of the Qur'anic verse, "Whoso judgeth not
by that which Allah hath revealed: such are disbelievers," (5:44) some Is-
lamic scholars placed any Muslim who refused to judge or be judged by
Shari'ah into that category. 52 "Apostasy in Islamic law is a much worse
offense than the Christian notion of heresy because Islam perceives itself as
a political community, not just a religious community. It follows that apos-
tasy is a form of treason against a very basic and all-encompassing group
identity and loyalty .... -53 Apostasy (ridda) was one of the seven hudud
offenses against God, the mandatory punishment for which involved physi-
cal pain. (The six others were theft, armed robbery, drinking alcohol, adul-
tery, slanderous claims of unchastity, and armed rebellion against the
leadership). Apostasy could be committed by word (blasphemy),54 by deed,
or by omission of a duty, so long as the offender intended the word, act or
50 YE'OR, supra note 43, at 57-58.
51 Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, Context for the Ayatollah's Decree: The Religious and
Political in Islam, in THE RusIDm FILE 223 (Lisa Appignanesi and Sara Maitland
eds., 1990).
52 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, The Islamic Law of Apostasy and Its Modem Ap-
plicability: A Case From the Sudan, 16 RELIGION 197, 213 (1986). Some scholars
insisted that such rejection of Shari'ah must be based on the belief that non-Islamic
rules are better and more just than Islamic rules. Id.
53 KANAN MAKIYA, CRUELTY AND SILENCE: WAR, TYRANNY, UPRISING AND THE
ARAB WORLD 90 (1993).
54 Technically, Islam has no precise equivalent to the term blasphemy, which is
derived from the Greek "to hurt" and "to speak" and used as the opposite of
"euphemy," the source of "euphemism". See DAVID LAWTON, BLASPHEMY 14
(1993). See also Arzt, supra note 42, at 374 n.99.
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omission with awareness of the penalty, death.55 The hudud crimes were
those acts that infringed not only on religion but also threatened community
interests in public order, thereby requiring state control. For instance, the
Qur'an calls for the death, mutilation or expulsion of those who take up
arms against Allah, "create discord on earth and strive after corruption."
(5:33).
However, no passage of the Qur'an actually specifies any penalty
per se for apostasy. The closest approximations state: "And for those who
disbelieve in their Lord there is the doom of hell, a hapless journey's end."
(Qur'an 67:6) "And whoso seeketh as religion other than the Surrender to
Allah (Islam), it will not be accepted from him, and he will be a loser in the
Hereafter." (Qur'an 3:85). Numerous other verses cajole the Muslim into
adhering to the faith, to avoid the temptation, ostensibly posed in particular
by the People of the Book, to convert, but the exhortation is moral, not
penal. Moreover, during his lifetime, Muhammed is said never actually to
have executed persons who, once having adopted Islam, later renounced it.
Nevertheless, conversion to another religion was considered apos-
tasy and may in practice have carried the death penalty. The Qur'an orders
those who "turn back" (to enmity) to be slain, "wherever you find them."
(4:89). This verse may have justified Muhammed's victory over pagan
tribes when he returned to conquer Mecca between the years 624 and 630.
More directly, Muhammed is reported to have said that "he who changes
his religion must be killed," unless he repents.56 This hadith was first com-
piled during the wars of apostasy after Muhammed's death, when some of
the previously converted Arab tribes in Medina renounced Islam by refus-
55 See Aly Aly Mansour, Hudud Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-
TEM 195, 197 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982). See also Taymour Kamel, The
Principle of Legality and Its Application in Islamic Criminal Justice, in THE IS-
LAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 150, 163-166 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982).
Some jurists omit rebellion from the list of seven Hudud offenses, while others also
omit wine drinking and apostasy, as neither the Qur'an nor Sunna prescribed spe-
cific penalties for them. Ahmad Abd al-Aziz al-Alfi, Punishment in Islamic Crimi-
nal Law, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 227 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
1982).
56 MAJD KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 150 (1955). The
Hanbali school put apostates to death immediately, while the other three Sunni
schools of jurisprudence gave apostates three days to reconsider, after which, if
they refused to retract their apostasy, they were executed. The Hanafis did not
execute women apostates, presumably because women would not engage in war
against Muslims. See Mohammed Talbi, Religious Liberty: A Muslim Perspective,
in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 182-183 n.16 (Leonard Swidler, ed.,
1986).
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ing to pay the alms tax. The first Khalifah, Abu Bakr, who was keen on
legitimizing his authority as successor, violently subdued the tribes after
reminding them of their agreement with God's prophet. He may have relied
as precedent on Muhammed's order to dismember and slowly kill a band of
apostates who murdered Muslim herdsmen and stole their cattle.5 7 But
Muhammed's original order may have been imposed for murder and theft,
not apostasy. Alternatively, it is possible that the early Muslim leaders and
jurists were confused over the Qur'anic tension between religion and polit-
ics, thereby improperly treating disobedience, communal betrayal, murder,
theft and perhaps mere breach of contract as apostasy.58 As the apostates in
the original situation had taken up arms against the Muslims, the death pen-
alty could also be considered an act of self-defense in wartime, rather than a
criminal punishment during peacetime.59
The Qur'anic statement quoted in this article's opening, "There is
no compulsion in religion" (2:256), is often cited to support the view that
death was not an authorized punishment for conversion. However, the re-
mainder of that same verse implies that the non-coercion rule applied only
to those who convert to Islam, not those who leave it:
There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is
henceforth distinct from error. And he who rejecteth false
deities and believeth in Allah hath grasped a firm handhold
which will never break. Allah is Hearer, Knower.
This would constitute a double standard. Although conversion to Islam
must be freely chosen, without fear and without coercion, "it is practically
impossible," it is often acknowledged, "once inside Islam, to get out of it. ' 60
Regardless of the actual punishment rendered, about which there
may have been no consensus, it is fair to conclude that conversion to a
religion other than Islam was treated as apostasy, a definite crime. And if
57 See An-Na'im, supra note 52, at 211-212.
58 Some modem scholars, however, believe that Abu Bakr was committing a po-
litical act of counter-rebellion for which a Hudud sanction was invoked collectively
and which was not intended to be applied to "pure" cases of individual apostasy.
See KHADDURI, supra note 27, at 238.
59 See Talbi, supra note 56, at 183. Therefore, it should not even be cited as a case
of apostasy, though it often is. See also Sachedina, supra note 32, at 80-82; Abdul-
aziz A. Sachedina, Al-Bukhari's Hadith on 'Killing Those Who Refuse to Fulfill the
Duties Enjoined by God and Considering Them Apostates, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES: WESTERN AND ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 97 (David Little, et al. eds., 1988).
60 Talbi, supra note 56, at 182 n.15.
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the apostasy was deemed to constitute an outright act of rebellion or sedi-
tion, it could, with Qur'anic sanction, be punished by death. Short of physi-
cal death, apostates who did not repent suffered various elements of "civil
death," including suspension of the right to dispose of property and to in-
herit property. Marriage contracts were dissolved upon the apostasy of ei-
ther spouse and their children were declared illegitimate. 61
Coda: Coercion or Choice?
It is difficult to summarize a body of legal principles that is so open
to pluralistic interpretation as those of jihad, dhimma and ridda. Did the
Qur'anic principle, "no compulsion in religion," apply to all non-Muslims,
or only to dhimmis?62 Did it apply only to persons seeking to convert from
another religion to Islam, but not vice versa? Assuming that non-scriptural
peoples of the dar al-Harb were not formally compelled to convert to Is-
lam, if their only choices were to die in battle, serve as a slave for their rest
of their lives, or convert, wouldn't the third choice necessarily have been
coerced? And if death was, at least under some interpretations, the punish-
ment imposed on Muslims who renounced Islam, is it any surprise that con-
version to other religions was generally a rare occurrence? More broadly, if
to become - and to remain - a Muslim meant, quite literally, to "submit,"
how would one know if a case of new or continued "submission" were a
voluntary act?63
To understand how these questions would have been answered in
the first few centuries of the Islamic era - if, indeed, they are not entirely
anachronistic questions - one needs to avoid thinking in twentieth century
terms, that is, from an individualistic perspective, which tends to interpret
religious creed as an entirely personal matter. For what if "conversion to
Islam in the early Islamic period was more a matter of social behavior than
of religious belief?"64 Or if, to most of the peoples who came under Muslim
61 See An-Na'im, supra note 52, at 212. See also ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 178 (1991), on the "civil death" of Baha'is in present-day
Iran.
62 At least two Islam scholars, al-Tabari and al-Razi, concluded that non-coercion
in the matter of religion was to be afforded only to the People of the Book - Jews,
Christians and Zorastrians - implying that others could be coerced into converting
to Islam. Others, such as al-Zamakhshari, believed that all human beings, not only
the People of the Book, were entitled to exercise free volition regarding religion.
See Sachedina, supra note 32, at 67-68.
63 BULLIET, supra note 30, for a linguistic commentary on the confusion between
the meaning of "surrender" and "convert."
64 BuLLIET, supra note 13, at 128.
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rule, "it did not much matter whether they were ruled by Iranians, Greeks or
Arabs," and in fact, they had good reasons for not being ruled by Iranians or
Greeks?65
The Qur'an required but three things of converts: to repent, to pray,
and to pay alms. (9:5)66 To become, or remain, a Muslim in the classical era
of Islam was more a matter of outward appearance than a question of either
spiritual faith or existential identity, two concepts that perhaps did not even
come into play until a later period of human history. If we can understand
this, we should also be able to understand how a sacred book which was
recorded in the 7th century C.E. could be reinterpreted in a myriad of ways
one, two or three and even thirteen centuries later. The following contem-
porary cases illustrate some of these possible reinterpretations - if not
misinterpretations.
IV. JIHAD, DHMMA AND RIDDA TODAY
Approximately one billion people practice Islam today; Muslims
constitute the majority of the population in over forty countries. 67 Thus, a
short survey of contemporary examples of religious freedom in the Islamic
world is naturally selective - if not vulnerable to accusations of invidious
selection - and unavoidably influenced by the filter of sensationalism
which Western media wield for their readers' consumption. The following
cases are, inevitably, among the most notorious, and therefore not necessa-
rily "typical." Nevertheless, when viewed collectively rather than in isola-
tion, they do reveal trends if not outright patterns which illustrate how the
concepts of jihad, dhimma and ridda can be abused in the name of state or
societal security.
65 HOURANI, supra note 22, at 23.
66 Of the Five Pillars of Islam, the latter four are behavioral, and even the first, the
shahada, is a public recitation, though it was meant to be fully believed. (Fasting
on Ramadan and the Haj were added after the Qur'anic itemization.) Contrast the
Judaic version of "Pillars," Maimonides' Thirteen Articles of Faith, each of which
begin, "I believe with perfect faith. " ABRAHAM E. MLGRAM, JEWISH WORSHIP
420-423 (1971).
67 These 40-plus countries include the Arab states of the Middle East and North
Africa such as Libya and Oman; the non-Arab Middle Eastern states of Turkey and
Iran; sub-Saharan African states such as Sudan, Djibouti and Nigeria; Asian states
such as Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia; Central European countries such as Al-
bania and Bosnia-Hercegovina; and recently independent Caucasian and Central
Asian states of the former Soviet Union such as Tajikistan and Azerbaijan.
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Jihad
The current use of this term is most familiar in the context of mili-
tantly anti-Israel Palestinian organizations, such as "Islamic Jihad," which
has frequently claimed responsibility for violent attacks not only on Israelis
but also against Palestinians alleged to have collaborated with Israel. The
more general "jihad movement" was established in Egypt, Syria, Jordan
and various other Middle Eastern states, growing out of the ideological di-
visions which evolved among certain Muslim fundamentalists before and
after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, as those countries attempted to deal with
their military defeat and the challenge posed by the continuation of Israel's
occupation of the Palestinian territories. 68 Whether the Arab-Israeli conflict
is perceived by Muslim groups as a jihad depends on the group's orienta-
tion. While the P.L.O. has traditionally addressed Israelis in their national-
ist rather than religious capacity, Islamic fundamentalist groups such as the
Muslim Brotherhood "make no distinction between Jews, Zionists, and Is-
raelis. Insistence on using the terms 'Jews' reflects the underlying religious
nature of the conflict as defined by the Brotherhood. '69
The term jihad, morever, has been used as a rallying cry against
"infidels" other than Jews or Israelis. For instance, complaining about a
U.S. ambassador's efforts to reconcile North and South Yemen and similar
American interventions, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi asserted in 1994:
Is it logical to see a Christian reconcile among the Mus-
lims, solve their problems, send their forces, protect Mus-
lims and their mosques? For us this is unacceptable. This is
our revolution, this is the true jihad for which we were born
and for which we are prepared to die .... Libya defies the
Christians and Jews which will harm Islamic sanctities, the
dignity and honor of Islam. We defy them even if we have
to sacrifice millions of people; it will not matter because
this is a historic battle.70
68 See ZIAD ABu-AMR, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE WEST BANK AND
GAZA: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ISLAMIC JIHAD (1994). See also Under Islam's
Banner, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 20, 1993, at 39; Malik, supra note 29. The "troops"
which carry out violent attacks on behalf of these organizations are called
mujahidin ("holy warriors").
69 ABu-AMR, supra note 68, at 26. On the recent increase in synagogue arson and
other anti-Semitic attacks in Europe, see Eric Silver, Target: Jews, THE JERUSALEM
REPORT, May 6, 2002, at 32.
70 Al-Qadhdhafi Blames Christians, Jews for Problems, MIDDLE E. INTELLIGENCE
REPORT, Feb. 16, 1994 (translated from Arabic from Tripoli Libyan Television Net-
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Now used to connote virtually everything from moral self-scrutiny to agri-
cultural transformation to an analogy to the Protestant ethic71 to outright
genocide, the word jihad and its very ambiguity have been exploited for
maximum propaganda use, most effectively when directed at two or more
audiences simultaneously. For instance, while in South Africa for Nelson
Mandela's inauguration, Yasser Arafat told an audience in a mosque: "Ji-
had will continue .... You must come to fight, to begin the jihad to liberate
Jerusalem." While opponents of the Israeli-P.L.O. accords - both Jewish
and Palestinian - took it to mean that Arafat still intended to conduct a
military battle over the city, Arafat himself claimed that he used the term in
a religious and peaceful sense.72
Perhaps the most peculiar case of jihad today is directed against a
group which proclaims itself to already be Muslim: the one million member
Ahmadi sect of Pakistan, which was founded as an Islamic revivalist move-
ment in India in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who claimed to be the
messiah and whose followers treat as a prophet. That is anathema to ortho-
dox Muslims, who fervently believe that Muhammed was the Final Messen-
ger of God. Themselves opposed to the use of violence, the Ahmadis were
the target of a 1953 pogrom incited by Muslim clerics. In 1974, Pakistani
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto agreed to amend the constitution to de-
clare the Ahmadis non-Muslims. A 1984 decree made it criminal for
Ahmadis to call themselves Muslims and their places of worship mosques,
to use Islamic terminology or the Muslim call to prayer, to proselytize their
beliefs or merely to say the name of the Prophet Muhammed.73 Over 100
work)(Passage omitted in original). See also Muslim Group Threatens Algerian
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994, at 21; Somalia: SSNM Interim Chairman Says
SNA is Ready for Dialogue to End Conflict with UNOSOM, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Aug. 2, 1993.
71 In a creative twist, Sudanese religious leader Hassan al-Turabi refers to trans-
forming Sudan from near-famine to self-sufficiency in food, "when people are
taught that agriculture is theirjihad, their holy struggle." As the World Turns: The
Islamic Awakening's Second Wave, 9 NEW PERSPECTIVES Q. 52, 53 (1992). Al-
though to "the rich West that may sound strange," he asks, "[Wihat role did Puri-
tanism play in carving America out of the wilderness? What role did the Protestant
ethic play in the development of the European economies? Religion is the motor of
development." Id.
72 See Documents and Source Material, 24 J. OF PALESTINE STUD. 131-132 (Au-
tumn 1994). See also 'Jihad' Not Necessarily a Call to Religious War, NPR ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED, May 18, 1994; The Happiest Jihad, NEW REPUBLIC, June 13,
1994, at 8.
73 See Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis
(Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance XX of 1984, in MAYER, supra note 61, at
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Ahmadis, including a baby, have also been arrested and subjected to death
sentences under the Pakistani blasphemy law. These official acts have in-
spired harassment by vigilantes such as the "Finality-of-the-Prophet Youth
Force," forcing many Ahmadis into exile in the U.S. and Canada.74
Dhimma
Somewhat less politicized today, or at least less notorious than ji-
had, is the term dhimmi. Only in the formally Islamic states of Saudi Ara-
bia, the Sudan, Iran and Oman are non-Muslim minorities afforded an
officially unequal status under law; distinctions between dhimmi and non-
dhimmi minorities are also lawful in these countries. In more secularized
Muslim countries, as in most other societies in the post-apartheid era, relig-
ious discrimination tends to be de facto rather than de jure.75 Non-Muslims
are now eligible for citizenship in every Muslim state except Saudi Arabia,
although with the exception of the occasional Tariq Aziz of Iraq or Boutros
Boutros-Ghali of Egypt (both Christians who rose to prominence in their
respective foreign ministries), non-Muslims rarely share in political power
or social influence.
Whether on account of the dhimma (and millet)76 systems, or purely
for purposes of political expediency, non-Muslims still serve as scapegoats
159-160. The decree was challenged in the Federal Shariah Court by group mem-
bers who had been sentenced to three years imprisonment and heavy fines. In a
peculiar analogy to trademark law, the Court held that the law was not contrary to
the Qur'an or Sunna, nor that it violated the rights to freedom of religion and to
equality. Only one judge viewed the decree as violating fundamental human and
constitutional rights. Id. at 160. See also Robert F. Drinan, Pakistan Falls Short On
Religious Freedom, CHISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 5, 1994, at 23; Mujeeb-ur-
Rehman v. Federal Government of Pakistan, PLD FSC 136 (1984).
74 See Pakistan: Asia Watch Says Drive to Islamicize Hurts Rights, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Sept. 19, 1993. See also Ahmadi Muslims Suffering at Hands of Pakis-
tanis: Reports, MONTREAL GAZET=E, Feb. 6, 1993, at 17; Rashid Ahmad Chaudhry,
Persecution in Pakistan, ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 1992, at 6.
75 While no less invidious, religious persecution which is not officially sanctioned
by state law allows governments to disavow responsibility, blaming such acts on
ostensibly eradicable, ancient, culturally based prejudices. See e.g. ROBERT A.
GOLDWIN ET AL., FORGING UNITY OUT OF DIVERSITY: THE APPROACHES OF EIGHT
NATIONS (1989); TED ROBERT GURR, MINORITIES AT RISK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF
ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS (1993).
76 The classical dhimma system had been given reinforcement in the 15th century
when the Ottoman Empire, under Muhammed II, introduced the millet system,
which confined Orthodox Christians, Armenian Christians and Jews in communi-
ties more segregated and hermetically sealed than they had been under the
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in parts of the Muslim world, such as when Mummar Qaddafi blamed
"Christians, non-believers and Jews" for a war in Afghanistan in which
Muslims killed fellow Muslims during the holy month of Ramadan. 77 Re-
cent reports of persecution of Christians and Jews, both official and vigi-
lante-based, come from Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, as well
as Egypt and the Sudan. For instance, Bishop Haik Hovsepian-Mehr, leader
of the Assemblies of God Christian community in Iran, was tortured and
murdered after protesting the closure of evangelical churches and the Bible
Society of Iran, refusing to sign a government-drafted declaration that non-
Muslims were not oppressed in Iran, and after working to save from execu-
tion a Muslim who had converted to Christianity. In Indonesia, Christians
as well as Buddhists and Hindus must officially register with the govern-
ment.78 Most recently, thirteen Jews, including rabbis and teachers, from
two rather remote Iranian towns have been sentenced to death for allegedly
serving as Israeli and American spies.79
Non-Muslim worship, both public and private, is completely for-
bidden in Saudi Arabia. Hundreds of Christians, including women and chil-
dren as well as men, have been arrested there, mostly without charge or
trial, often leading to deportation. Christians have also been sentenced
under Pakistan's blasphemy law, one man reportedly when he refused to
support a Muslim League candidate in local elections. Another Pakistani
Khalifahs. The religious leaders of these non-Muslim groups were held responsible
for all acts and activities, both secular and religious, of their members, none of
whom were eligible for civilian office on the imperial level. The millets were not
abolished until 1856, by which time their cultural influence was established in what
would become modem-day Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Jordan,
Egypt, all of North Africa, Greece and the other Balkan states, and parts of India
and Russia. It was at this same time in the mid-19th century that thejizya tax, paid
by dhimmis in lieu of military service, was abolished in Egypt. However, another
1856 Egyptian decree prohibited any building or renovation of Christian churches
without presidential permission, which has never been readily granted. See William
Soliman Kilada, Christian-Muslim Relations in Egypt, in THE VATICAN, ISLAM AND
THE MIDDLE EAST 254 (Kail C. Ellis ed., 1987). See generally HAIM GERBER,
STATE, SOCIETY AND LAW IN ISLAM: OTTOMAN LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE (1994); J.J. SAUNDERS, THE MUSLIM WORLD ON THE EVE OF EUROPE'S Ex-
PANSION (1966).
77 See Al-Qadhdhafi Blames Christians, Jews for Problems, supra note 70.
78 See Bernard Levin, Martyred For His Faith, LONDON TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1994. See
also Chris Hedges, Persecution of Christians Mounts in Iran, INTERNATIONAL HER-
ALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 2, 1994; Harvey Shepherd, In the Name of God; Human-Rights
Group Reports Religious Persecutions, MONTREAL GAZETrE, Feb. 20, 1993, at K6.
79 See A.M. Rosenthal, Waiting for the Noose, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1999.
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Christian was murdered after posters appeared at his workplace accusing
him of blasphemy. Local police officers reportedly congratulated his
killer.80 In Egypt, some Islamist fundamentalists seek to revive the most
demeaning of the dhimma rules by calling on Muslims to shun Christians
and to refuse to shake their hands, wish them well on Christian holidays or
walk on the same sidewalk. 81
Of the one dozen separate Christian denominations that reside in
the Middle East today, the largest and most consistently persecuted are the
two Coptic Churches, found in both Catholic and Christian Orthodox forms.
Constituting about 10% of the population of Egypt, with smaller communi-
ties in Ethiopia and the Sudan, the Copts are extremely endogamous, insist-
ing on a separate existence in order to maintain their pre-Muslim, non-Arab,
ancient Egyptian lineage. In 1981 President Anwar Sadat exiled the Coptic
pope, censored the Coptic press and held Coptic bishops and priests under
house arrest after they defended their community from violence incited by
Islamic militants. 82 In the last few years, Islamist militants have attacked
and killed numerous Egyptian Copts, publicly harassed them and prevented
80 See Saudi Arabia: Religious Intolerance: The Arrest, Detention and Torture of
Christian Worshippers and Shi'a Muslims, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 14,
1993; see also Pakistan: Asia Watch Says Drive to Islamicize Hurts Rights, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 19, 1993.
81 See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Fundamentalists Impose Culture on Egypt, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1994, at Al.
82 Before the arrival of Muslims in about the year 640, Egypt was a Christian
province of the Byzantine Empire. Early Muslim-Coptic relations there were mutu-
ally respectful. Centuries later, Copts supported Egyptian nationalist movements
which sought independence from British and French colonial rule. Muslim Egyp-
tians began to resent the Copts for what was perceived as favoritism by the Western
imperial powers. In the early 18th century, waves of Coptic refugees were forced to
flee Egypt for the Sudan. More recently, Egyptian Copts have been the targets of
Islamic revivalists and other militants, beginning with the breakdown of pluralistic
Egyptian life in the 1950's, under President Nasser and later under Sadat. In 1957
the Coptic community formally protested against restrictions on the building of
churches and discrimination in housing, land distribution and the holding of public
office. In 1972 planned provocations against the Copts were publicly announced by
the Egyptian Ministry of Religious Affairs. See COLBERT C. HELD, MIDDLE EAST
PATTERNS: PLACES, PEOPLES AND POLITICS 88, 91, 364-365 (1994). See also
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Religious Freedom in Egypt: Under the Shadow of
the Islamic Dhimma System, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 51-52
(Leonard Swidler, ed., 1986); Kilada, supra note 76; NADIA RAMSIS FARAH, RELIG-
IOUS STRIFE IN EGYPT: CRISIS AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN THE SEVENTIES
(1986).
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them from performing religious rituals and celebrating social events. Copts
have also been harassed and tortured by Egyptian state security forces for
attempting to convert Muslims to Christianity.83
The case of the Baha'is of Iran is perhaps the most enigmatic of
all.84 Baha'is, who today number over five million in more than 232 coun-
tries and dependent territories,8 5 believe that their 19th century religious
83 In 1992, at least 18 Copts were killed by Islamists in Egypt, including a physi-
cian murdered in his clinic. See The Copts: Passive Survivors Under Threat, AF-
RICA WATCH, Feb. 10, 1993, at 2. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Middle East,
"Egypt: Violation of Freedom of Religious Belief and Expression of the Christian
Minority, Nov. 1994. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1993 1171 (1993). Similarly, in Pakistan, Christians may
convert non-Muslims, but not Muslims. See Joseph Cardinal Cordeiro, The Chris-
tian Minority in an Islamic State: The Case of Pakistan, in THE VATICAN, ISLAM
AND THE MIDDLE EAST 279, 282 (Kail C. Ellis ed., 1987). Ninety-nine percent of
Pakistani Christians are Pakistani-born. Id. at 288.
84 The Baha'i faith was founded in Persia in 1863 by Baha'u'llah, a follower of
the Bab, who two decades earlier had prophecized the coming of Islam's "Twelfth
Imam," who would prepare humanity for the universal divine Messenger that is
anticipated by all the major scriptural religions. Baha'u'llah, who claimed to be
God's messenger, preached that humanity is a single race and a single religion
which should be unified into one global society, organized through a world federal
system. His other principles included: the elimination of all prejudice; gender
equality; elimination of extreme poverty and wealth; universal education; the har-
mony of science and religion; and a sustainable balance between nature and tech-
nology. The faith would have no clerics or individually powerful leaders; all
decisions would be made by democratically elected, collective assemblies.
Baha'is, moreover, would be obedient to civil government but forbidden to engage
in partisan political activity. These teachings were very popular in 19th century
Persia and therefore threatening to both the secular and religious authorities, partic-
ularly given the direct challenge to Shiism over determination of the Twelfth Imam.
Baha'u'llah was accordingly imprisoned and then banished, while the Bab and
20,000 followers were executed as apostates. See Mayer, supra note 61, at 157-158.
See also BAHA'I INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE BAHA'I QUESTION: IRAN'S SE-
CRET BLUEPRINT FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF A RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY: AN EXAMI-
NATION OF THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHA'IS OF IRAN 1979-1993 10-12 (1993);
BAHA'I INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE BAHA'Is: A PROFILE OF THE BAHA'I
FAITH AND ITS WORLDWIDE COMMUNITY 17-23 (1992).
85 The faith claims adherents from over 2,100 different ethnic and tribal groups
around the world. Of the over five million Baha'is, only 350,000 live in Iran, but
they constitute that state's largest religious minority. See THE BAHA'I QUESTION,
supra note 84, at 6. Although the Baha'is living in Iran are mainly fifth or sixth
generation descendants of Muslims and of the same Persia ethnicity as the majority
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leaders, Bab and Baha'u'llah, are the latest in a series of God's messengers,
who have included Abraham and Moses, Krishna, Buddha, Jesus and
Muhammed. To Muslims, this is heretical and blasphemous, as they con-
sider Muhammed to be "the Seal of the Prophets," God's final messenger.
Moreover, Baha'i egalitarianism challenges the Shariah's strict notions of
gender differences, not to mention Shiite Islam's formal hierarchy of cleri-
cal power. However, while acknowledging that the faith originated in Persia
among Muslims, Baha'is claim theirs to be an independent religion, not a
sect of Islam.86 This makes their case a kind of mirror image of the perse-
cuted Ahmadi Muslims of Pakistan, whom Islamic authorities treat as an
independent religious minority, not a sect. Both Ahmadis and Baha'is fol-
low a prophet who post-dates Muhammed, without, however, denying or
denigrating his teachings. Regardless of their own respect for Muhammed,
each group risks being treated as apostates from or blasphemers of Islam -
despite their claims to heterodoxy, in the case of the Ahmadis, or to being
non-Muslims, in the case of Baha'is.
The 1979 Iranian constitution formally recognizes Jews, Christians
and Zorastrians but makes no mention of Baha'is, who constitute Iran's
largest religious minority,87 even though, as a scriptural monotheism, the
Baha'i faith should be entitled to dhimma status. There is little doubt, how-
ever, that Baha'is are the most persecuted minority in Iran. Since 1978,
more than 200 Baha'i administrative officials or teachers have been exe-
cuted (including two teenage girls), sometimes after summary trials in ab-
stentia, or otherwise stoned or burned to death. Hundreds of others have
been imprisoned and tens of thousands have been dismissed from civil ser-
vice jobs and universities and deprived of pensions and businesses. Baha'i
administrative structures have been banned and holy places and cemetaries
destroyed, confiscated or vandalized.88 In 1993, a secret document surfaced
of Iranians, on a global basis few Baha'is of today have such origins. It is among
the fastest growing of the world's independent religions. See THE BAIA'IS, supra
note 84, at 14.
86 "Today, religious specialists recognize that [referring to the Baha'i faith as a
'sect' of Islam] would be equivalent to calling Christianity a 'sect' of Judaism, or
referring to Buddhism as a 'denomination' of Hinduism." See THE BAHA'IS, supra
note 84, at 10, (citing to historian Arnold Toynbee in support of the independent
status of the faith).
87 IRAN CONST. art. 13.
88 See MAYER, supra note 61, at 158. See also THE BAHA'IS, supra note 84, at 59;
ODIO ELIZABETH BENITO, ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF INTOLERANCE AND Dis-
CRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGION OR BELIEF 10 (1989), (citing to the U.N. Special
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which confirmed that these acts were all officially sanctioned by Iranian
President Rafsanjani and the state's religious leader, Ali Khamenei.89
Iranian officials have been inconsistent in the justifications em-
ployed in their campaign to "block" Baha'i "progress and development,"
the language used in the secret document. Sometimes overtly religious
grounds are used, as when the words, "Enemy of Islam" were found written
on the leg of a Baha'i executed in 1981, or when the Attorney General said
about death penalties carried out that same year: "The Quran recognizes
only People of the Book as religious communities. Others are pagans. Pa-
gans must be eliminated." 90 Before execution, Baha'is are often pressured
to recant as apostates - another indication of the religious basis of their
persecution. On the other hand, the Iranian government has also charged
Baha'is with supporting the late Shah's regime and collaborating with his
secret police; engaging in prostitution, adultery and immorality; and serving
as agents of Zionism. In actuality, Baha'is were also persecuted by SAVAK
and the Pahlavi regime. The criminal charges stem from the government's
refusal to recognize Baha'i marriages and from the mixed seating at Baha'i
gatherings, and from the coincidental location in Israel of the Baha'i World
Center, even though it was established in the 19th century at the instructions
of the exiled Baha'u'llah.91
Ridda
While the notorious case of Salman Rushdie is the best known ex-
ample of punishment for apostasy in contemporary Islam, his is by no
means a singular instance. Recent legislation in Yemen and the Sudan pe-
nalize apostasy as well as blasphemy. In Yemen, the 1990 Law on the Press
and Publications bans any publication which, inter alia, "prejudices the Is-
lamic faith and its lofty principles or belittles religions or humanitarian
creeds... [and which] "distort[s] the image of the Yemeni, Arab or Islamic
heritage. '92 While capital punishment for apostasy was first introduced by
coup-leader Nimeiri in 1983, article 126 of the post-Nimeiri 1991 Sudanese
Penal Code now authorizes the death penalty for any non-repenting Muslim
Representative's report); Mark Jolly, Too Good for Hanging, LONDON TIMES, June
26, 1993; THE BAHA'I QUESTION, supra note 84, at 14-23.
89 See THE BAHA'I QUESTION, supra note 84, at 36-41.
90 Id. at 25, 17.
91 See Id. at 24-26; MAYER, supra note 61, at 169, 178. See also Iran Dismisses
U.N. Report of Rights Abuses, REUTER LImRARY REPORT, Nov. 26, 1993, reporting,
"Iranian officials say that the Baha'is who were executed were convicted of spe-
cific charges, usually spying, and were not killed because of their beliefs."
92 Yemen: Steps Toward Civil Society, MIDDLE E. WATCH, Nov. 1992, at 8.
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who "advocates the rejection of Islamic beliefs or announces his own rejec-
tion of Islam by word or act." Although recent converts are by law to be
treated more leniently, many fear prosecution should they revert to their
original religion, as they tend to be Christians and animists as well as Ethio-
pian refugees who nominally converted to Islam or took Muslim names in
order to receive relief, avoid discrimination, or marry Muslims. 93
In a recent case illustrating the potential reach of this law, Sudan's
justice minister as well as its government-controlled press attacked a human
rights investigator reporting to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. For
his report, which described Sudan's slave trade and noted that its criminal
code authorizes punishments such as amputation and crucifixion, Gaspar
Biro, a Hungarian law professor, was called "satanic" and "an enemy of
Islam" guilty of "blasphemy. '94
In Saudi Arabia, two newspaper editors were sentenced to prison
and to hundreds of lashes for printing a comic strip from the syndicated
series "B.C.," which facetiously questioned the existence of God, while in
Iran, a cartoonist and his magazine editor were similarly sentenced for a
drawing of a soccer player adjudged to resemble the late Ayatollah
Khomeini. 95 These latter cases illustrate not only how the doctrine of ridda
can be used to punish opponents of state policy; it can also be taken to
ridiculous lengths to entrap the wholly inadvertent and innocent antagonist.
Even more disturbing are nonofficial vigilante cases, which often
result in brutal assasinations, ordered without trial by Islamic revivalists in
93 See Sudan: New Islamic Penal Code Violates Basic Human Rights, AFRICA
WATCH, April 9, 1991, at 7-8. While the Penal Code only applies in Northern
Sudan, many non-Muslim Southern Sudanese now live in the North.
94 Ken Ringle, The Next Rushdie? Gaspar Biro Spoke Out. Sudan's Government
Condemned Him, WASH. POST, Mar, 26, 1994, at Dl; see also Paul Lewis, Sudan
Calls UN Official a Blasphemer, INT'L HERALD T RB., Mar. 9, 1994. In a similar
case involving Malaysia, the International Court of Justice rendered an advisory
opinion that official communications by U.N. personnel are immune from prosecu-
tion or civil damages. See Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of
a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62 (April
29, 1999).
95 See Garry Trudeau, Drawing, Dangerously, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 1994, at E19.
On the soccer example and others from Iran, including a sewing pattern said to
contain a profile of Khomeini in the folds of a dress, see Guardians of Thought:
Limits on Freedom of Expression in Iran, MIDDLE E. WATCH (Aug. 1993). Apos-
tasy and blasphemy charges are not the only method of government censorship. An
Iranian author was arrested on charges of espionage and drug abuse for criticizing
the clerical leadership, a move protested by 150 Iranian writers. See also Iranian
Writers Ask for an End to Censorship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at A10.
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countries where they threaten government stability. While militants in
Egypt and Algeria have killed government officials, foreign tourists, relig-
ious minorities and average Muslim civilians in the course of their struggles
for power, when they target intellectuals they often rely on ridda as a ratio-
nale. For instance, Farag Fouda, one of Egypt's leading secular intellectuals
and a vocal critic of militant Islamists as well as the Egyptian government,
was murdered in June 1992, his teenage son also wounded in the attack. A
statement by the group al-Gama'a al-Islamiya, which took responsibility,
justified the killing because Fouda was an apostate, an advocate of separa-
tion of religion and state, and an opponent of the use of Shariah as Egyptian
law. 96 His murderers were defended by a senior theologian, Sheik Ahmad
Ghazali, who stated in court that Fouda and "secularists" like him are apos-
tates who should be put to death by the government. If the government
failed to carry out that "duty," the Sheik testified, individuals were free to
do SO.
97
Other Egyptian writers, such as Nobel Prize winner Naguib
Mahfouz, have been subject to relentless attacks as "corrupters of youth"
and "the filth of the artistic community." Mahfouz, who had publicly de-
nounced the death warrant against Rushdie and supported Anwar Sadat's
peace accord with Israel, was "excommunicated" by the fatwa of Sheik
Omar Abdul Rahman, who demanded that the author denounce his own
1959 novel, Children of Gebelawi. The author was later stabbed in the neck
by a militant.98 In Algeria, the poet and teacher Youssef Sebti was found
with his throat cut in his office in an Islamic militant-controlled region in
96 See Egypt: Grave Human Rights Abuses Amid Political Violence, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL 11 (May 1993); see also Farag Foda, A Murdered Writer's Proph-
ecy, N.Y. TImms, Nov. 10, 1993, at A27. Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, the spiritual
leader of the militant group that took responsibility for Fouda's killing, was also the
lead defendant in the second World Trade Center bombing conspiracy case.
97 See Youssef M. Ibrahim, supra note 81, at Al, A10. A similar anti-secular
sentiment was voiced by Tunesian Sheik Rashid el-Ghanoushi. Asked why Arab
and Muslim intellectuals must be murdered, he responded: "Some of these secular-
ists are the devil's advocate, they are Pharaoh's witches. The educated who put
their brains and their talent in the service of an oppressive regime have made their
own decisions. They must bear the responsibility of their choice." See also Youssef
M. Ibrahim, As Islamic Fundamentalist Abroad Talks Freely on Limits on Free-
dom, N.Y. TIrEs, Jan. 9, 1994, at E7.
98 See Karim Alrawi, Goodbye to the Enlightenment, 23 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP
112, 113 (May/June 1994). See also Fires of Hell, 23 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 118
(May/June 1994); Chris Hedges, Novelist's Unwitting Role: Sword Against Mili-
tants, N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 15, 1994, at A4. The Egyptian government has ended its
ban on The Children of Gebelawi, which has now been reissued there for the first
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December 1993, while in May of that year, Algerian writer Tahar Djaout
was murdered. 99 A university professor was shot after he refused to start his
classes with readings from the Quran.100
CONCLUSION
In so many of the above-described contemporary cases, religious
themes, doctrines and rationales are intertwined with political slogans,
motivations and objectives. Often, a traditional religious veneer serves to
camouflage a politically motivated or radically violent core. Because Islam
makes no real distinction between state and religion, or between community
politics and Shar'iah law, it may be impossible to separate out these influ-
ences. The power of state-sanctioned legislation and judicial decision-mak-
ing (or, as in the case of al-Qaeda, fatwa-issuing clerics) can be used to
accomplish dual purposes: both spiritual supremacy and physical domina-
tion. Yet Muslim history also teaches that Islam is simultaneously capable
of both sectarian diversity and sectarian intolerance. All religions - and
all schools within a religion - have the right to define their own terms of
membership. But while threats to public order may, in appropriate cases,
justify a limitation on the public expression of heretical religious views, an
Islamic regime or "network" of any size or purpose that uses a religious
rationale to silence its political enemies abuses both human rights and its
Muslim cultural heritage.
time since 1959, but given the continuing threats against Mahfouz, publication may
constitute "a second assassination attempt." Id.
99 See Algerian Poet Slain in Muslim Militant Area, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at
A5. Egypt and Algeria are not the only sites of such vigilante murders of writers.
For instance, the Saudi Arabian poet, Sadiq Melallah, was decapitated. See also
FOR RUSHDIE, supra note 2 (unpaginated Publisher's Statement). This book, cre-
ated by over 100 intellectuals from a dozen countries, was first published in French
in 1993 in order to draw attention to the threats and assasinations by Islamic ex-
tremists against numerous writers, not only Rushdie; see Alan Riding, Muslim
Thinkers Rally for Rushdie, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at C17.
100 See Human Rights Abuses in Algeria: No One is Spared, MIDDLE E. WATCH 59
(Jan. 1994). About 60 foreigners and 4,000 Algerians were killed in the crossfires
of the two-and-a- half-year armed struggle between Islamicists and the military
government, which caused thousands more, including many intellectuals and pro-
fessionals, to flee to France and other Arab countries. See also Lynn Terry, Islamic
Fundamentalists Murder Thousands of Algerians (NPR Morning Edition, Aug. 10,
1994) (Transcript No. 1408-5). See Between Two Fires, 23 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP
135 (Sept./Oct. 1994) (a collection of essays by censored Algerian authors).
